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8.1  Introduction 
In this paper we present an analysis of  state and federal individual income 
tax enforcement programs. We develop an econometric model of state and fed- 
eral tax audit selection decisions and audit assessments and then present a de- 
tailed empirical analysis of Oregon state and federal tax audits. We investigate 
the degree to which the federal and state tax authorities employ similar audit 
selection criteria, the correlation between state and federal noncompliance, and 
the allocation of state audit resources between independent audits and “piggy- 
back” audits based on federal enforcement efforts. 
The majority of studies in the empirical academic literature on tax compli- 
ance have  investigated compliance with central government tax obligations. 
We believe the study of state tax compliance and enforcement and the relation- 
ship between state and federal compliance and enforcement is important for 
several reasons. In the United States the magnitude of  noncompliance with 
both state and local taxes is probably at least as large, as a percentage of  total 
obligations, as the magnitude of noncompliance with federal tax obligations. 
In many cases a household’s decision about how much of its state tax liability 
to pay may be closely related to its decision about how much of its federal tax 
liability to pay, especially when the state and federal tax bases are similarly 
defined, as they are in many states. As a result a state tax authority may find 
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that an effective enforcement strategy is to piggyback on federal enforcement 
efforts, following up on federal audit cases for which a large amount of non- 
compliance is detected. The fact that state noncompliance is likely to be highly 
correlated with federal noncompliance has some important implications. First, 
it influences how  state tax authorities allocate their limited tax enforcement 
budget between independent audits and piggyback audits. Second, it raises a 
host of  policy  questions about the proper balance and relationship between 
state and federal tax enforcement programs, questions that are especially rele- 
vant in an era in which the size of the federal government may be reduced and 
the role of state governments  in providing basic goods and services may in- 
crease. Our analysis is intended to address all of these issues, as well as other 
related topics. 
Since little information has been published about state tax enforcement pro- 
grams, we decided to conduct a survey of the 50 states to learn more about 
their audit programs (a copy of this survey is available on request).'  To date 
we have received responses from 32 states.* Table 8.1, based on these survey 
responses, provides some information about state enforcement programs and 
compares these programs to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) enforcement ef- 
forts. As indicated by the figures in the table, state enforcement levels are quite 
low in comparison with federal enforcement levels, especially in regard to the 
individual income tax. Thus, state budgets for enforcement and tax administra- 
tion are smaller than average IRS state-level budgets, state audit rates are gen- 
erally much lower than the federal audit rate, and the magnitude of assessments 
(the total of additional taxes, interest, and penalties) generated by independent 
state audits is much smaller than that generated by federal audits. Our focus in 
this paper  is on the relationship  between  state and federal tax enforcement 
efforts. Our survey results indicate that the states rely extensively on informa- 
tion provided by the IRS through its revenue agent reports (RARs) on federal 
audits and its CP2000 notices  on federal  reporting  discrepancies  identified 
through the Information Returns Program. In particular, as shown in table 8.1, 
on average states conduct more piggyback audits based on federal information 
than independent audits, and the total magnitude of assessments generated by 
piggyback audits is larger than  that generated by  independent  audits. Other 
results from the survey (not reported in table 8.1) indicate that, although the 
states obtain much information from the IRS, they provide relatively little in- 
1. Note that compliance and enforcement issues surrounding state sales tax have been examined 
in some detail (see Due and Mikesell 1993). 
2. These states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illi- 
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Car- 
olina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
Several states (Maryland, Michigan, and Massachusetts) have declined to respond to the survey. 
Most of the remaining states have indicated that they will eventually provide some information. It 
should also be noted that the survey is not limited to the individual income tax; other major state 
taxes and their associated audit programs are also surveyed. 237  The Relationship between State and Federal Tax Audits 
Table 8.1  Collection and Enforcement Activities by the States and the IRS for 
the Individual Income Tax, 1992 
Amount 
Agency budget ($ per capita) 
State individual income tax audit budget' 
Total state tax agency budgeta 
IRS state-level budget' 
State independent audits= 
RARs and CP2000 reportsa 
IRS audits 
States from independent audits" 
States for RARs and CP2000 reportsa 
IRS audits 
States in the survey' 
All statesa 
IRS 
Audit rate (%) 
Additional assessments for the individual income tax ($ per capita) 













Sources: State data on individual income tax collections, additional assessments, audit rates, and 
agency budgets are calculated from the survey of state tax administrators, as discussed in the text. 
IRS data are calculated from the Internal Revenue Service 1992 Annual Report. 
Note: All averages are simple unweighted averages. 
aAverage  across the states. 
formation in return. The states also seem to follow somewhat different audit 
selection procedures than the IRS, relying less on computer algorithms or sta- 
tistical methods for the selection of returns for audit, and instead often choos- 
ing returns based on previously productive accounts, random selection, spe- 
cific tax items or filer characteristics, or a comparison of information on state 
returns with information from other sources. A striking result of the survey is 
the degree of  variation in state income tax enforcement efforts. Some states 
undertake no independent audit efforts, even though they have significant in- 
come tax programs, while others, such as Oregon (on whom we concentrate 
our empirical analysis in this paper), have  quite ambitious independent en- 
forcement programs. 
The survey results indicate that states rely extensively on federal enforce- 
ment efforts and that state and federal audit selection procedures may be simi- 
lar but are not identical. The results also suggest that there may be much room 
for changing and improving state audit programs. Our analysis in this paper is 
designed to investigate these findings in greater detail. 
Our behavioral model accounts for state and federal tax audit decisions and 
assessments, including state piggyback audits, in a common framework. The 
model consists of two periods. In the first period the federal and state tax au- 
thorities simultaneously and independently select cases for audit and make 
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performing a piggyback audit on any case for which, in the first period, the 
federal authority performed an audit and the state did not. We assume that each 
authority selects a case for audit whenever its expectation of the revenue to be 
earned from conducting the audit exceeds the shadow cost of  audit resources. 
We also assume that each authority observes a private signal of  the revenue 
associated with a case prior  to making its audit decision, and we allow the 
signals of  the two authorities to be correlated. Our empirical framework in- 
cludes a careful specification of the revenue assessment distribution faced by 
each authority, and it contains a rich stochastic structure that allows for several 
different kinds of correlations between federal and state assessments. 
We estimate our model using a data set that combines information on federal 
and state audit programs  in  Oregon. Oregon  is a medium-sized  state, con- 
taining approximately  1 percent of  all U.S. households. It is a good state in 
which to study individual income tax compliance and enforcement, both be- 
cause it collects more than two-thirds of its total tax revenues from the individ- 
ual income tax (versus only about one-third on average for other states) and 
because it has a very active tax enforcement program. Our data include detailed 
federal and Oregon state tax return  information for 43,500 Oregon filers for 
tax year 1987, as well as audit results for the 4,400 filers in the sample whose 
1987 federal returns were selected for an IRS audit and the 2,800 filers whose 
1987 state returns were selected for either an independent audit or a piggyback 
audit by the Oregon Department of Revenue (ODR). 
We report estimates for three separate audit classes: a business class, a farm 
class, and a nonbusiness, nonfarm class. Four aspects of our results are particu- 
larly interesting. First, we find that state and federal assessments are strongly 
positively correlated, as expected. Second, we find that the IRS and ODR audit 
selection criteria overlap, but only partially. In the business and farm classes, 
each authority seems to rely heavily on its private signal in deciding whether 
or not to select a case for audit. The private  signals of  the two agencies are 
highly correlated within these classes, indicating a substantial overlap between 
federal and state information. However, each agency’s signal appears to con- 
tain information about the other agency’s revenue assessment that is unknown 
to the other agency, a finding which suggests that the federal and state tax 
authorities could improve their audit selection procedures in these classes by 
exchanging more information. In the nonbusiness, nonfarm class the authori- 
ties seem to rely less on their private  signals and more on filers’ reports of 
certain tax return line items in making their audit selection decisions, so infor- 
mation sharing seems less important. Third, using our results we are able to 
estimate the shadow value associated with providing additional audit resources 
to each tax authority. We estimate that the shadow value associated with pro- 
viding the IRS with an additional dollar of audit resources is approximately $5 
for the business class, $2.50 for the farm class, and $4 for the nonbusiness, 
nonfarm class. We estimate that the shadow value associated with providing 
the ODR with an additional dollar of audit resources is approximately $1, $2, 
and $3 for the business, farm, and nonbusiness, nonfarm classes, respectively. 239  The Relationship between State and Federal Tax Audits 
For ODR piggyback audits, we estimate that the shadow value of  additional 
resources is between  $2 and $3 for the business and nonbusiness, nonfarm 
classes; however, we are unable to reliably  estimate  the  value for the farm 
class. Our results indicate that the IRS might be able to increase its audit reve- 
nues by reallocating  some of its audit resources from farm audits to business 
audits. In contrast, it would appear that the ODR could increase its audit reve- 
nues by shifting some of its resources out of business audits and into nonbusi- 
ness, nonfarm audits. The piggyback audit results indicate that the ODR might 
also  benefit  by  performing  more  piggyback  audits  and  fewer  independent 
audits within the business and farm classes. Fourth, we report a number  of 
interesting findings from a detailed examination of Oregon’s audit programs, 
which suggest that the state could increase revenues by making greater use of 
IRS information and by increasing the number of audits of nonresident filers. 
Our work in this paper is related to several other studies of compliance and 
enforcement. The econometric specification we develop builds on the theoreti- 
cal  analysis of  the  tax  compliance  game  presented  in  Erard  and  Feinstein 
(1994b). In addition, the data employed in this study have been used in prior 
research by Erard and Feinstein (1994~1,  1994c) on federal tax reports and audit 
selection decisions. Our work is also related to studies of taxpayer and auditor 
behavior by Alm, Bahl, and Murray (1993), Beron, Tauchen, and Witte (1991), 
and Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990). 
8.2  Modeling State and Federal Audit Interactions 
In this section we present our framework for analyzing tax audit decisions 
and assessments. We divide our presentation into two parts. First, we present a 
model of auditing by a single tax authority. We then extend our model to the 
case in which there are two separate tax authorities, which we label “federal” 
and “state.” These models form the basis for our empirical analysis of Oregon 
and IRS tax audit decisions and assessments for tax year 1987, which is pre- 
sented in section 8.3. 
8.2.1  Single-Agency Model 
Consider a tax authority charged with collecting the taxes owed by  each 
member of a community of  individuals or households. Although many mem- 
bers of the community pay their full tax liability voluntarily, others do not. The 
authority cannot costlessly observe each member’s true liability and determine 
whether the member is fully in compliance. Instead, the authority must use 
audits to detect noncompliance. In this subsection we present a simple model 
of the authority’s audit selection decisions and assessments. We divide our dis- 
cussion into four parts. First, we specify an audit assessment distribution; next, 
we describe the tax authority’s calculation of  the expected assessment to be 
earned from performing  an audit; then, we define audit costs and derive an 
audit selection criterion; finally, we present the likelihood function associated 
with our model. 240  James Alm, Brian Erard, and Jonathan S. Feinstein 
Audit Assessments 
Consider first the specification of audit revenue assessments, which is the 
most complex part of our model. For a taxpayer  who has been audited, we 
define R as the amount of  additional taxes, interest, and penalties that the tax- 
payer is assessed. For a taxpayer who has not been audited, we define R as the 
amount that would have been assessed if an audit had taken place. The assess- 
ment R may be positive, in which case the taxpayer owes R dollars to the gov- 
ernment; zero; or negative, in which case the individual has overpaid his taxes. 
In our data, described much more fully below, approximately 70 percent of 
all federal audits result in a positive assessment, 23 percent result in no assess- 
ment, and 7 percent result in a negative assessment. Further, the mean positive 
federal assessment is more than twice as large as the mean negative  assess- 
ment, and the variance of positive assessments is much larger than the variance 
of negative assessments, in part because there are a small number of very large 
positive  assessments.  The statistics  for state audit  assessments  are similar, 
though not identical. Our specification of the distribution of R reflects these 
facts, in two main ways. First, in contrast to several previous  studies of tax 
compliance, including Clotfelter (1983) and Feinstein ( 199  l), we distinguish 
negative assessments from zero assessments, in order to more precisely model 
the assessment di~tribution.~  Second, we specify a log-normal distribution for 
positive assessments, in order to fit the long right-hand tail of very large posi- 
tive assessments recorded in our data. 
We specify the distribution associated with R in terms of a two-step process 
consisting of three equations. The first step distinguishes positive assessments 
from nonpositive (zero or negative) assessments. We define the latent variable 
P*  as 
(1) 
and assume that the assessment is positive if P* is greater than zero, but other- 
wise the assessment is either zero or negative. In expression (I), x1  are charac- 
teristics of the individual or household under consideration, p, is a parameter 
vector, and w is a stochastic disturbance. The second step involves one of two 
expressions, depending on the sign of P*. If P* is greater than zero, the assess- 
ment R is positive and is defined by 
P*  = PIXl  + w 
where x2 are characteristics of the individual or household,  p,  is a parameter 
vector,  and E  is a stochastic disturbance. Alternatively,  if P*  is less than or 
equal to zero, then the assessment R is either negative or zero, according to a 
Tobit specification given by 
3. The only two previous studies of which we  are aware that distinguish negative from zero 
assessments are Alexander and Feinstein (1987) and Erard (1995). 241  The Relationship between State and Federal Tax Audits 
(3) 
-a+u  ifu<a, 
0  otherwise, 
R={ 
where (Y is a constant and u is a stochastic disturbance. We discuss the distribu- 
tions associated with the stochastic disturbances w,  E, and u below. 
It is important to recognize that our specification of the assessment distribu- 
tion is neither derived from nor meant to be interpreted as a structural model 
of reporting beha~ior.~  Instead, the model reflects our view of the way in which 
a tax authority is likely to evaluate the assessment distribution. We believe the 
authority is likely first to evaluate the probability that the taxpayer has under- 
paid his taxes, using equation (1) and including in x,  individual or household 
characteristics that affect the probability of an underreport. We believe the au- 
thority is likely next to evaluate the magnitude of an underreport, conditional 
on an underreport occurring, using equation (2).  In equation (2),  x,  includes 
individual  or household  characteristics  that  influence  the  extent  of  under- 
reporting, and the exponential parameterization  captures the long right-hand 
tail, reflecting the small probability of a very large positive assessment. We 
note that x1  and x2  may contain some common elements but are unlikely to be 
identical. We believe the authority is likely to consider last the possibility that, 
conditional on no underreport, there is a negative assessment, evaluating both 
the probability and likely extent of  such a negative assessment by means of 
equation (3). We doubt that most tax authorities develop a careful model of 
negative  assessments, partly  because  such  assessments  are relatively  infre- 
quent and of small magnitude, and partly because it is not obvious what indi- 
vidual or household variables are likely to be associated with overpayments. 
Hence we do not include any explanatory variables in equation (3). 
Note that the assessment R is not equivalent to the difference between the 
taxpayer’s legal tax obligation and his tax payment, for four reasons. First, the 
tax examiner may not detect all of the taxpayer’s underpayment  or overpay- 
ment.  Second, the  examiner  may  tend  to exaggerate  the  size of  an under- 
payment, in an effort to obtain greater enforcement revenue for the tax agency. 
Third, the assessment may include interest and penalty charges for detected 
underpayments. Fourth, the examiner and the taxpayer may negotiate over the 
size of the assessment, in which case the final outcome will depend on the 
relative bargaining strengths of the two parties5 
4.  Alexander and Feinstein (1987) and Erard (1995) both present a more elaborate model of 
taxpayer reporting errors and underreports. In particular, both studies present models in which 
errors are symmetrically distributed around zero, negative assessments are always due to error, 
and positive assessments are due either to error or to intentional evasion. 
5. It should also be noted that the amount the taxpayer is assessed during an audit may differ 
from the amount that is eventually received by the tax authority, either because the assessment is 
later reduced following an appeal by the taxpayer, or because the taxpayer fails to pay the assessed 
amount. We  leave it to future research to  incorporate these issues into a model of  compliance 
and enforcement. 242  James Alm, Brian Erard, and Jonathan S. Feinstein 
Calculation of the Expected Assessment 
As the next step in the description of our model, consider the tax authority’s 
calculation of the expected value of the assessment associated with a particular 
taxpayer, a calculation that plays a central role in the authority’s audit selection 
decision. We assume that the authority knows the form of equations (l), (2), 
and (3), including the  forms of the  distributions  from which the stochastic 
disturbances are drawn, and knows the values of all parameters that enter into 
these three equations. We also assume that the authority observes the explana- 
tory variables x, and x, prior to making its audit selection decision, but does 
not observe the values of the stochastic disturbances, w,  E, and u, and therefore 
does not observe the actual assessment R. Last, and important, we assume that 
prior to making its audit selection decision the authority is able to observe the 
value of  a signal, denoted q,  that provides information about the assessment 
R. We integrate the signal into our revenue assessment model by assuming that 
q is correlated with each of w  and E and therefore provides information about 
both  the probability  of a positive  assessment  and, conditional on a positive 
assessment occurring, the likely magnitude of the assessment. We do not allow 
for the possibility that q  is correlated with u since we doubt that the authority 
is likely to observe information about the likelihood or magnitude of a negative 
assessment. Intuitively, we expect that the greater is q,  the greater will be the 
tax authority’s calculation of the expected value of the assessment to be earned 
from performing an audit. Although q is observable to the tax authority, we 
assume that it is not recorded in the data available for analysis and therefore 
must be treated as a stochastic disturbance in the econometric specification. 
The fact that q  is a stochastic disturbance is important for the structure of both 
our econometric model and the associated likelihood function; we discuss the 
role of q  in the model and the likelihood function below. 
Having introduced the signal q,  we can now specify distributions for w,  E, 
q,  and u. We assume that w,  E, and q are jointly drawn from a trivariate normal 
distribution and that u is independently drawn from a separate normal distribu- 
tion. We impose several restrictions on these distributions. The first restriction 
is that the unconditional mean of each disturbance is zero. The second restric- 
tion is that the standard error of w (uW)  is equal to one, a normalization that is 
required for identification for the same reason that the standard error in a probit 
model is set equal to one, namely, because  only the  sign of P*  affects the 
assessment R. The third restriction, similar to the second, is that the standard 
error of the signal q (u,,)  is equal to one, a normalization that is required for 
identification because, in the likelihood function, q is associated with the tax 
authority’s decision about whether to conduct an audit, a binary choice that is 
modeled in a manner analogous to a probit model. The final restriction is that 
(conditional on q)  w and  E  are independent of  one another; for the trivariate 
normal distribution, this restriction is equivalent to the condition that  p,,  = 
p,,,,pqIE,  where pab is the correlation between random variables a and b. We im- 243  The Relationship between State and Federal Tax Audits 
pose this final restriction primarily to ease the computational burden associated 
with estimating the model. 
After these restrictions have been imposed, there are four remaining parame- 
ters to be estimated. Two of the parameters are standard errors: ue,  the standard 
error associated with positive assessments, and cr,,, the standard error associ- 
ated with negative assessments. The other two parameters are correlations: pqw  , 
which measures the information contained in the signal about the probability 
of  a positive assessment, and pqe, which measures the information contained 
in the signal about the likely magnitude of a positive assessment, conditional 
on a positive assessment occurring.6 Note that, although E is normally distrib- 
uted, the distribution of positive assessments is log-normal, due to the expo- 
nential form of equation (2). 
We let E(R1-q)  denote the expected value of the audit assessment, conditional 
on the value of  the signal q.  Using well-known properties of the normal and 
log-normal distributions, E(Rlq)  can be expressed as 
where +( .) and @( -)  are, respectively, the standard normal probability and cu- 
mulative density functions. The first term in equation (4) is the probability of 
a positive assessment multiplied by the expectation of  the magnitude of the 
assessment, conditional on a positive assessment occumng. The second term 
is the probability of a nonpositive assessment multiplied by the expectation of 
the magnitude of a negative assessment, conditional on a nonpositive assess- 
ment occumng and taking into account the probability of a zero assessment. 
Audit Selection Criterion 
Consider now the tax authority’s audit selection criterion. Our specification 
of  this criterion is based upon the theoretical analysis of the tax compliance 
game presented  in Erard and Feinstein (1994b). They show that a revenue- 
maximizing tax  authority that has a fixed audit budget, is risk neutral,  and 
cannot precommit to its audit rule will select a return for audit whenever the 
expected revenue to be earned from performing the audit exceeds Ac, where c 
is the audit cost and  A  is a Lagrange multiplier  associated with the budget 
constraint. The multiplier  A is an important policy parameter because it pro- 
vides a measure of the increase in tax revenues that can be achieved by increas- 
ing the tax authority’s audit budget. In particular, if A exceeds one the govern- 
ment can increase its total revenue by raising the tax authority’s audit budget. 
6.  We note that either one of the correlations may be fully identified, but then only the absolute 
value of the other correlation is identified, because of the form of the likelihood function. 244  James Ah,  Brian Erard, and Jonathan S. Feinstein 
Therefore, a revenue-maximizing  government would want to provide the tax 
agency  with  sufficient  resources  to  make  h  equal  to  one.  This  revenue- 
maximizing policy  might  not, however, be an optimal policy  from a social 
welfare  perspective.  The revenue  raised  from additional  audit  resources  is 
merely a transfer from noncompliant taxpayers to the government, whereas the 
audit resources employed to effect this transfer represent a genuine resource 
cost. The welfare-maximizing  value of  A,  therefore,  may be well  in excess 
of one. 
Adapting  the criterion of Erard and Feinstein  (1994b) to our context, we 
conclude that the tax authority will choose to audit a taxpayer  whenever the 
expected revenue conditional  on the observed  signal, E(Rlq), is equal to or 
greater than the shadow cost of an audit, hc. In our econometric analysis, we 
treat Xc  as a single parameter;  however, we have separate information about 
audit costs, so we are able to deduce an estimate of h by dividing our estimate 
of hc by a rough estimate of c. 
We assume that the expected value of the revenue assessment is nondecreas- 
ing in q,  which implies that there exists some threshold signal, q*,  such that 
for all q > q*,  E(RJq)  2  hc, while for q <  q*,  E(R1-q) 5 hc.’  It then follows 
that the authority will choose to audit a taxpayer if and only if the signal q  is 
equal to or larger than the threshold  value q*. The threshold  value for the 
signal is determined implicitly by the equation 
E(Rlq*) = xc. 
Likelihood Function 
As the final step in the presentation of  our model of a single tax authority, 
we present the likelihood function associated with the model. Each observation 
refers to a particular individual or household and falls into one of four catego- 
ries: no audit, audit and positive assessment,  audit and zero assessment,  or 
audit  and negative  assessment.  The likelihood  associated  with  no  audit  is 
simply 
or the probability that the signal is below the threshold value q*.  Note that q* 
is a function of the characteristics x, and x2  and therefore varies across individ- 
uals and households.  The likelihood  associated  with an audit and a positive 
assessment in the amount R is 
7. This assumption is always satisfied when p,,  and p,,  are both positive. The condition is also 
satisfied if one correlation is positive and the other negative, provided that the negative correlation 
is not too large in absolute value relative to the positive correlation. Our econometric estimation 
has never produced estimates for which the condition fails to hold. 245  The Relationship between State and Federal Tax Audits 
where R is the audit assessment and BN[-;,  p] represents the standard bivariate 
normal cumulative distribution function with correlation p. The likelihood as- 
sociated with an audit and a zero assessment is 
L, = BN [- y*, - 
Finally, the likelihood associated with an audit and a negative assessment is 
(9) 
where again R is the assessment, which in this case is negative. 
8.2.2  Joint-Agency Model 
In the United States and many other countries most individuals and house- 
holds are obligated to pay taxes to more than one political jurisdiction. When 
this is the case and the tax authority associated with each jurisdiction conducts 
tax audits, many questions arise concerning issues that are important both for 
the understanding of tax enforcement systems and for tax policy formulation. 
To  what extent do the authorities employ similar selection criteria? To  what 
extent do they coordinate their selection processes? To  what extent do they 
share audit results and other information? When they both audit the same indi- 
vidual or household, do they detect the same noncompliant behavior? Finally, 
is the marginal value of an additional dollar of audit resources approximately 
the same for the different authorities? 
In this subsection we present a model that addresses these and related ques- 
tions. The model includes  a large collection of individuals (or households), 
each of whom is obligated to pay taxes to two jurisdictions, federal and state. 
We assume that each jurisdiction has a tax authority, and each authority con- 
ducts audits. In addition, we assume that the state tax authority can use results 
from federal audits to perform piggyback audits. We divide our presentation 
into two parts. We first describe the conceptual structure of the model, which 
is based on the framework presented in the previous subsection. We then derive 
the likelihood function associated with the model. 246  James Alm, Brian Erard, and Jonathan S. Feinstein 
Model Structure 
Consider a particular individual or household. Our model of  the state and 
federal  tax  authorities’  decisions  about  whether  to  audit  the  individual  or 
household consists of two periods. In the first period each authority decides 
whether to audit the individual or household and, if it conducts an audit, makes 
a revenue assessment. The authorities’ period-one decisions are made simulta- 
neously and are independent of  one another. If  in period one either the state 
authority has conducted an audit or the federal authority has not conducted an 
audit, then period two is not applicable and the model terminates at the end of 
period one. Otherwise, there is a second period, during which the state author- 
ity learns the federal period-one audit results and then decides whether to per- 
form a piggyback audit. The piggyback audit consists of two stages: first, the 
federal audit results and the taxpayer’s state return are used to determine the 
additional  revenue  owed  to  the  state; second,  the  individual  is  notified  of 
the assessment. The piggyback audit is much less expensive than a period-one 
audit since it involves neither direct face-to-face contact with the individual 
nor a careful investigation of the individual’s tax records.s 
We use the framework presented in subsection 8.2.1 to model both the fed- 
eral audit assessment distribution  and the federal tax authority’s period-one 
audit selection decision. In particular, we let R, denote the federal assessment 
that either is generated by a federal audit or would have been generated if the 
individual or household had been subjected to a federal audit. Similarly, we let 
xlf  and x,, denote characteristics of the individual or household that affect the 
federal assessment and enter into equations (1) and (2);  w,,  E,, and uf denote 
the stochastic disturbances that are associated with the federal revenue assess- 
ment distribution and enter into equations (l), (2), and (3); and qf  denote the 
signal observed by the federal tax authority. Finally, we define the threshold 
value for the federal signal qf*  as the value of qf  for which E(R,  I q:)  = X,cf, 
where  X,  is the multiplier associated with the federal audit budget constraint 
and cf  is the cost of a federal audit. We assume that E(R,  I qf)  is greater than or 
equal to Arcf  if and only if qf  2  qr. It then follows that the federal tax authority 
performs an audit whenever  q, is equal to or greater than q:.  As should be 
clear from our description, the federal tax authority observes only its own sig- 
nal -qf prior to making its audit decision; it does not observe the analogous state 
signal T,,  which is introduced below. 
Our specification of the state period-one independent audit assessment dis- 
tribution also is based on the framework presented in section 8.2.1; however 
our specifications of the state piggyback assessment distribution and the state 
tax authority’s audit selection procedure are somewhat different. We let R, de- 
note the state period-one assessment; x,,  and x2s denote characteristics of the 
8.  In actual practice, the state may need to contact the taxpayer if the information on the taxpay- 
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individual or household that affect the period-one  assessment and enter into 
the state versions of equations (1) and (2); w,,  E,, and us  denote stochastic dis- 
turbances that enter into the state versions of equations (l), (2), and (3); and 
q,  denote the signal observed by the state tax authority. We define the cost of 
a state independent audit to be A,c,,  where A, is the multiplier associated with 
the state’s independent audit budget constraint and c, is the cost of an indepen- 
dent state audit. We expect c, to be smaller than cf since state audits are nor- 
mally shorter and simpler than federal audits. If the federal and state govern- 
ments were able to share budgets  and revenues,  we  might expect  A,  to be 
approximately equal to  A,,  since, if  one A-value were larger than the other, 
audit resources could be transferred to the authority with the larger A-value, 
increasing total government revenues. Since governments do not share budgets 
and revenues to this extent, however, we expect A, to be somewhat smaller than 
A,,  because at least in most cases the state tax rate is substantially below the 
federal rate. 
We let R, denote the assessment that either is generated by  a period-two 
piggyback audit or would have been generated if the state had chosen to con- 
duct such an audit. Since the piggyback audit is based directly on the period- 
one federal assessment, R, is likely to depend upon R,. However, R, may not be 
exactly proportional to R,, due to differences in tax progressivity, differences in 
the tax treatment of certain issues between  the federal government and the 
state, differences in penalty and interest charges, and possible administrative 
errors. We define 
In equation (lo), h(.)  is a parametric function that depends on the federal reve- 
nue assessment R, and a vector of explanatory variables x,,  which control for 
differences between the federal and state tax bases, tax rate schedules, and 
credit structures. We assume that the state tax authority knows the functional 
form of h, inclusive of the values of the parameter vector p,  and the “displace- 
ment parameter” K, which accounts for the possibility that R, is negative. The 
term .sp  is a stochastic disturbance. The state does not have direct knowledge 
of cP;  rather it observes a signal q, of its likely value at the beginning of period 
two, prior to deciding whether to perform a piggyback audit. We assume that 
a piggyback audit has a shadow cost of h,c,.  We expect cp  to be substantially 
below both c, and c,. If the state tax authority is allocating its audit resources 
efficiently, A,  should be approximately equal to A,,  since, if one A-value were 
much larger than the other, the state could increase its revenues by  shifting 
audit resources from the audit program associated with the smaller A-value to 
the audit program associated with the larger A-~alue.~ 
We consider mainly a nonstrategic model of the state tax authority’s audit 
9. The two A-values also might differ if the shadow value associated with state budgetary re- 
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selection process. This model is based on the assumption that the state author- 
ity performs  a period-one  audit whenever  the expected  revenue  assessment 
exceeds the audit cost, without taking into consideration the possibility that it 
may be able to perform a piggyback audit in period two if the federal tax au- 
thority performs a period-one audit and the state authority does not. In con- 
trast, a strategic model would assume that the state does take into account the 
potential for a period-two piggyback audit when making its period-one audit 
decision. We believe the nonstrategic model is descriptive of actual state audit 
selection decisions but that states might be able to increase their audit revenues 
by adopting the audit selection rule generated by the strategic model. In the 
remainder of this section we describe the nonstrategic model in more detail 
and derive the likelihood function associated with it. In section 8.3 we present 
results from estimation of the nonstrategic model, and in the appendix we pro- 
vide a more detailed description of the strategic model. 
We define the threshold value for the state signal q,*  as the value of q,  for 
which E(R,  I q,*)  = X,c,,  and we assume that E(R5  1 q,) is greater than or equal 
to XFcc  if  and only if q,  2 q,*.  For the nonstrategic model, it then follows that 
the state chooses to conduct a period-one audit if and only if the signal q,  is 
equal to or greater than q$.  Note that the state observes only the signal q,  in 
period one and has no knowledge of either the federal signal q,  or the federal 
authority’s decision about whether to audit the individual. If the state authority 
does not perform a period-one audit but the federal tax authority does perform 
such an audit, then in the second period the state authority must decide whether 
to perform a piggyback audit. Define q:  to be the value of the signal q,  for 
which E(R,  I 7:’  R,) = X,c,,  and assume that for all values of R,, E(Rp  I q,, R,) 
is equal to or greater than  Xpcp if and only if q, 2 q;.  It then follows that 
the state authority will choose to perform a piggyback audit if and only if the 
signal q,  is equal to or greater than q:.  Note that, for a given value of  the 
signal q,,  E(RP  I q,, R,) is nondecreasing in R,, so the threshold value q:  is a 
nonincreasing function of R, and the probability of a piggyback audit is a non- 
decreasing function of the federal assessment R,. 
As the final step in the description of our model of state and federal tax audit 
decisions, consider the distribution of the stochastic disturbances in the model. 
We  assume that (wf,  w,, E,,  E,, qf,  q,) are drawn from a multivariate normal 
distribution, and we impose the following conditions on this distribution: Fol- 
lowing the specification presented in subsection 8.2.1, we normalize each of 
uT,,  uqS,  uws,  and u,,~  to 1. We then make the following assumptions: (condi- 
tional on q,) E, and w,  are independent, (conditional on q,) E, and w,  are inde- 
pendent, (conditional on q,) w,  is independent of both qt  and E,,  and (condi- 
tional on q,) w, is independent of both q,  and E~.  The latter two assumptions 
are made primarily to ease the computational burden associated with estimat- 
ing the model. The distribution then depends upon a total  of  eleven param- 
eters. Six of the parameters are familiar from the model of the previous sub- 
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pqfwf,  pqsw,,  pqfcf, and  pqsEs.  The remaining five parameters are new,  and they 
represent features of the relationship between the federal and state audit assess- 
ment processes. These five parameters are (1) pqflls,  the correlation between the 
two signals; (2) psps, the correlation between the two &-disturbances;  (3) pwfws, 
the correlation between the two w-disturbances; (4) prlfeS,  the correlation be- 
tween the federal signal qf and the disturbance E, in the state revenue model; 
and (5) pqsSf,  the correlation between the state signal q,  and the disturbance E~ 
in the federal revenue model. We  discuss the interpretation of these parame- 
ters below.lo 
We assume that the disturbances uf and u, are drawn from a bivariate normal 
distribution with parameters uUf,  uUg,  and pufys,  and that each of  u, and u, is 
independent of the other stochastic disturbances in the model. We also assume 
that q, and B~ are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution, and we impose 
as a normalization that the standard deviation of q, is 1, leaving two free pa- 
rameters in this distribution, (T,  and p,,  .  In addition, we assume that each of 
q, and ep is independent of  thpe  other stochastic disturbances in the model. 
Finally, we note from equation (10) that the assumption that ep  is normal im- 
plies that R, is distributed according to the displaced log-normal distribution, 
with displacement parameter K. 
Our model provides a rich structure for analyzing the relationship between 
federal and state tax audit decisions and assessments. A comparison of  the 
variables included in x,,  and x,,  with those included in x,, and xZs,  and of  the 
parameter vectors p,, and p,,  with the vectors PI,  and P2s,  can provide informa- 
tion about the extent to which the variables that influence federal audit deci- 
sions and assessments are similar to those that influence state decisions and 
assessments. If the two sets of variables and parameters turn out to be signifi- 
cantly different, further research will be necessary to determine whether the 
differences are due to differences in tax law, differences in reporting behavior, 
or differences in audit selection and assessment procedures. If  there are sub- 
stantial differences resulting from different audit and assessment procedures, 
our models may help administrators to improve their procedures. The parame- 
ter P,,~,,~  measures the correlation between the signals observed by  the federal 
and state authorities. If this correlation is positive, it will serve as an indication 
that the two authorities have access to similar sources of information, and draw 
upon similar experiences, in evaluating assessment distributions. Conversely, 
if  the correlation is negative, we might infer that the two authorities tend to 
PP 
10. A consideration of the covariance matrix associated with this multivariate normal distribu- 
tion may clarify the restrictions we have imposed. Order the disturbances as q,,  qs,  w,,  w,,  E,, and 
E,, The covariance matrix is 6 X 6. Consider the upper triangular portion of this matrix. The first 
four diagonal entries are  1. The next two diagonal entries are cr:,  and  ere; In the first row the 
remaining elements are pqfVs,  p,,,,,  p,,  pTFVs,  u,,~,,  and crTfeC  In the second row the remaining ele- 
ments  are  p,,,  p,,,,,  pvSw3,  u,,~,,  and  u,,~~.  In  the  third  row  the  remaining  elements  are 
pwrWs,  p,,,,  ulfSll and  p,,+  u,,~~.  In  the  fourth  row  the  remaining  elements  are  p,,  u,,~,  and 
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draw upon  different  sources of  information and experiences  in formulating 
their audit policies. In either case, so long as the two signals are not perfectly 
correlated, the potential will exist for both agencies to improve their audit poli- 
cies by  sharing the  information  contained  in their  signals. Comparisons  of 
p,,,,  to pqSWs  and of p,,,,  to p,5EF  will indicate whether the signal observed by the 
federal authority is more informative than the signal observed by the state au- 
thority, a comparison  which  provides  an interesting  measure of the relative 
capabilities of the two authorities. The cross-correlations p,,,,  and p,,,,  measure 
the degree to which the signal observed by one authority provides information 
about the likely magnitude of a positive  assessment for the  other authority, 
conditional on a positive assessment occurring. To  understand the empirical 
phenomena to which these cross-correlations relate, consider pvfZ,.  If this cor- 
relation is larger (more positive) than p,f,sp,lse,,  then conditional on q,  the likely 
magnitude of a positive  state assessment is larger, the larger is q,. Since the 
federal authority is more likely to audit the larger is -qf, a large positive value 
for pqfFI  implies that, conditional on the state's making a positive assessment, 
the magnitude of the assessment is expected to be larger when the federal au- 
thority  has chosen to perform  an audit than  when the federal authority has 
chosen not to perform an audit. More important from the viewpoint of policy, 
these cross-correlations provide an indication of the value of information shar- 
ing between the two tax authorities. For example, so long as the value of  p,,, 
is different from the value of p,f,,p,ses,  the federal government will be able to 
help the state improve its audit selection procedures by sharing the information 
contained in the federal signal."  Finally, pWfwF,  pEfEs,  and pufus  measure the extent 
to which federal and state assessments are correlated. We expect each of these 
correlations to be positive, but we are particularly interested in their magni- 
tudes, especially that of  peps.  Of course, we do not expect federal and state 
assessments to be identical, or even proportional, due to differences in tax law 
and in  the  specific items  of  noncompliance  detected  during the  respective 
audits.12  However, a finding of large differences between state and federal as- 
sessments may serve as an indication that revenues can be increased by pooling 
audit results for cases subjected to independent audit by both agencies. 
Likelihood Functions 
The likelihood function associated with our model is rather complex. There 
are four qualitatively distinct outcomes possible for the federal tax authority in 
11. As described previously, we have imposed restrictions on the other two cross-correlations, 
pvt7,s  and pVs,,. In future analysis, we may allow these parameters to be free as well. However, when 
all four cross-correlations are free, the single-agency model estimates are not consistent in the 
joint-agency model, which significantly complicates estimation; see our discussion of estimation 
strategy in the main text. 
12. The results of Alexander and Feinstein (1987). Feinstein (1991). and Erard (1995) all indi- 
cate that detection is quite imperfect. See the discussion of empirical results, in particular n. 20, 
for some information about the relationship between federal and state assessments among those 
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the model: (1) no audit; (2)  audit, positive assessment; (3) audit, no assessment; 
and  (4) audit, negative assessment. There are five qualitatively  distinct out- 
comes possible for the state authority: (1) no audit; (2) independent audit, posi- 
tive assessment; (3) independent audit, no assessment; (4) independent audit, 
negative assessment; and (5)  no independent audit, piggyback audit. Since the 
form of the likelihood function depends on the outcomes for both authorities, 
there are therefore 20 potential cases to be considered. However, because the 
state authority can perform a piggyback audit only when the federal authority 
has performed an audit in period one, only 19 of these cases are relevant. We 
do not present the likelihoods associated with all 19 cases. Rather, we present 
the likelihoods for 6 representative  cases and leave the remaining cases to be 
worked out by the reader, if interested. 
Case 1. Federal  audit and positive  assessment,  state audit and positive  as- 
sessment: 
(11)  L, = 
where BN(  .;,p)  represents the standard bivariate normal distribution function 
with correlation coefficient p andf(.) is a multivariate conditional normal den- 
sity function, derivable from the distribution functions defined above for the 
stochastic disturbances. 
Case 2. Federal audit and positive assessment, state audit and zero assessment: 
where +(-)  and a(.)  are, respectively, the standard normal probability and cu- 
mulative density functions. 
Case 3. Federal  audit and positive  assessment,  state audit and negative  as- 
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Case 4. Federal  audit and positive  assessment,  no state independent  audit, 
state piggyback: 
In  (RP + K) -  h(R,,x,:P,))  + (""'  -  PZfX1,) 
+(  upp  uef 
L, = 
RfUs,(Rp + muz 
\ 
Case 5. Federal audit and positive assessment, no independent state audit, no 
state piggyback: 
Case 6. No federal audit, no state audit: 
The parameters of the model can be estimated jointly by maximizing the 
full likelihood function. However, we have chosen to estimate the model using 
a much simpler estimation strategy, which is based on the observation that the 
joint model we have outlined in this subsection nests the single tax authority 
model presented in subsection 8.2.1. In particular, we estimate the parameters 
of the model in four steps. First, we estimate the federal audit selection and 
assessment parameters corresponding to equations (l), (2), and (3) from the 
previous  subsection: this  estimation  yields consistent  estimates of  p,, , p,,  , 
UEf> P,,W,7  P,,,,?  nu,)  and  X,c,.  Next,  we estimate the state audit selection and 
assessment parameters corresponding to the state version of equations (l),  (2), 
and  (3);  this  estimation  yields  consistent  estimates  of  PI,,  PZs, uEs, 
pqSw,,  pqsEs,  nus  and Xscs.  Note that each of these first two steps involves estimat- 
ing the model presented in subsection 8.2.1. Third, we estimate the piggyback 
audit selection and assessment equation (10) on the subset of cases for which 
the federal government performed a period-one audit and the state did not; this 
estimation yields consistent estimates of pp,  p  ,  and uE  .  Finally, we estimate 
the full likelihood function, maximizing  over &e six r%maining  parameters, 
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pTfqs,  pTfCs,  pTSEf,  pwfWs,  P,,,,~.,  and P,,,,.  As discussed in section 8.3, we perform 
our estimation using a choice-based data sample. We therefore make an adjust- 
ment to the estimated standard errors associated with all parameter estimates 
to account for this feature of  the data. The two critical assumptions that are 
necessary for our estimation procedure to yield consistent estimates are that 
pqfw3  = pTfTspqsws  and pTswf  -  pqSTf  pTfW,.  If, for example, the first of these equali- 
ties failed to hold, then E(Rslqs,  qf)  would no longer be equal to E(R,  I q,)  and 
we would not be able to estimate the state audit selection and assessment pro- 
cess separately from the federal selection and assessment pro~ess.'~ 
- 
8.3  Empirical Results 
In this section we describe the results from our empirical analysis of  ODR 
and IRS tax audits for tax year 1987. We divide our discussion into three parts. 
First, we describe the data we used in our study. Second, we present and dis- 
cuss results from the estimation of  the model of  state and federal tax audit 
decisions and assessments presented in the previous section. Third, we discuss 
a number of other interesting findings that have emerged from a detailed inves- 
tigation of Oregon's individual income tax audit programs. 
8.3.1  The Data 
Our analysis is based on tax return and audit information that has been com- 
piled from several different sources. Our information about federal and state 
1987 tax returns comes from two sources, the ODR Personal Income Tax Re- 
turn  Extract File database and the IRS Individual Returns Transaction File 
(IRTF) database; research staff at ODR matched the taxpayer records from 
these two databases for us.I4 Our information about audits of federal and state 
1987 tax returns also comes from two sources, the ODR Audit Casedata File 
database, which contains information about ODR audits, and the IRS Audit 
Information Management System database, which contains information about 
IRS audits. We  obtained the IRS audit information through a match based on 
social security numbers that was performed by  the IRS research staff. We 
merged the tax return data with the audit data to create the data set used in 
our analysis. 
Our data set is a subset of the total population of Oregon filers for tax year 
1987. In order to ensure that a large number of audit cases would be included 
13. In fact, all that is required for the estimation procedure to yield consistent estimates is that 
either  the  two  equalities  in  the  text  hold  and/or  the  following  two  equalities  hold: 
14. Approximately 8.5 percent of our sample of Oregon returns failed to match with any IRTF 
record. When weighted, these numbers indicate that approximately 9.3 percent of all Oregon re- 
turns in the population would fail to match with any IRTF  record. About 70 percent of all returns 
that fail to match are part-year or nonresident returns, which we exclude from our analysis in 
any case. 
- 
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in our sample, we heavily oversampled filers that were subjected to an audit. 
In addition, we sampled business and farm returns at a higher rate than other 
returns. Our sampling procedure was as follows. For returns that were  sub- 
jected to any form of enforcement action by the ODR or the IRS, we selected 
every return that reported any business (federal schedule C) or farm (federal 
schedule F) income (positive or negative) and one-half of all those returns that 
reported neither business nor farm income. For returns that were not subjected 
to any enforcement action at either the state or federal level, we selected 6 
percent  of  returns that reported business income, 25 percent of  returns that 
reported farm income but no business income, and 1.75 percent of returns that 
reported neither business nor farm income. 
For our econometric analysis, we have excluded returns for part-year resi- 
dents and nonresidents, and returns that failed to match with the IRS IRTF 
database,  leaving  43,587  observation~.'~  This  total  includes  approximately 
4,500 returns that were  selected for a federal audit,  1,700 returns that were 
selected for an independent state audit, and  1,200 returns that were selected 
for a state piggyback audit. Our data include extremely detailed tax return in- 
formation. In particular, for each observation we have nearly every line item of 
the federal  1040, 1040A, or 1040EZ form as well as federal schedule A; se- 
lected line-item information from federal schedules C, D, E, and F; and nearly 
every line item from the Oregon return, which may be either a form 40F (full- 
year long form) or a form 40s (full-year short form). The data identify whether 
the return was selected for a federal audit, and if the return was selected for a 
federal audit, the data indicate the auditor's  assessment of the additional tax, 
interest, and penalties owed by the taxpayer at the time the case closed. Simi- 
larly, the data identify whether the return was selected for an Oregon audit, and 
if  the return was selected for an Oregon audit, the data identify whether the 
audit was an independent or a piggyback audit and indicate the final assess- 
ment made at the time the case closed. 
Tables 8.2 through 8.6 provide additional information about the data sample 
from which we selected returns for our econometric analysis. The frequency 
figures  in table 8.2 are unweighted  and provide  information about numbers 
of observations in our sample, while dollar amounts are weighted  to reflect 
population  statistics. The dollar figures presented in each of  the tables repre- 
sent the additional tax, interest, and penalties that were assessed  during the 
relevant audits. Table 8.2 indicates that there were slightly more than one mil- 
lion filers in Oregon in 1987, 63,000 of whom were placed in one of the IRS 
business audit classes, 7,300 of whom were placed in one of the IRS farm audit 
classes, and 941,000 of  whom were placed in one of the IRS nonbusiness, 
15. Excluding these kinds of returns reduced our sample by 5,511 observations, the number of 
federal audits by 813, the number of independent Oregon audits by 94, and the number of Oregon 
piggyback audits by 48. We discuss part-year and nonresident filers in subsection 8.3.3. 255  The Relationship between State and Federal Tax Audits 
Table 8.2 
Audit  Total  Business  Farm  Nonbusiness, Nonfarm 
Audit Results by IRS Audit Category 
Unweighted number returns 
Weighted number returns 
Federal audit cases 
Overall frequency 
No-change frequency 
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Note: Frequencies are unweighted; dollar amounts are weighted to reflect population totals. 
nonfarm classes.I6 Our sample includes 6,492 returns from the business audit 
classes, 1,945 returns from the farm audit classes, and 35,150 returns from the 
nonbusiness, nonfarm classes. In total, our sample contains 4,433 IRS audit 
cases, of which 1,073 were audits of returns falling in a business class (busi- 
ness audits), 148 were audits of  returns falling in a farm class (farm audits), 
and 3,212 were audits of returns from a nonbusiness, nonfarm class (nonbusi- 
ness, nonfarm audits). Slightly less than one-quarter of all audits resulted in 
no additional assessment; however, approximately 40 percent of all farm audits 
16. It is important to note that many filers who possess some business or farm income nonethe- 
less are not placed in a business or farm audit class. The IRS has specific, somewhat complex 
rules for assigning returns to audit classes. In general, a return is assigned to a business or farm 
class only if total business or farm group receipts are sufficiently large relative to the  taxpayer’s 
total positive nonbusiness income, as calculated based on the information reported on the return. 256  James Ah,  Brian Erard, and Jonathan S. Feinstein 
resulted in no additional assessment. Approximately 6 percent of all audits in 
our  sample resulted in  a negative  additional assessment; the mean negative 
assessment in the population was $1,330, while the median negative assess- 
ment was $283. The percentage  frequencies  of  negative  assessments  in the 
various  categories were  quite similar to the  overall frequency,  although the 
mean and median levels of these assessments for the business category ($3,287 
and  $698, respectively) were much  larger than  the overall average. In each 
audit category the majority of federal audits resulted in a positive assessment. 
In particular, 71 percent of all audits in our sample, 73 percent of all business 
audits, 52 percent of  all farm audits, and 72 percent of  all nonbusiness, non- 
farm audits resulted in a positive assessment. The mean positive assessment in 
the population was $3,073 for all audits combined, $5,502 for business audits, 
$4,3  10 for farm audits, and $2,472 for nonbusiness, nonfarm audits. The me- 
dian positive assessment was $1,021 for all audits combined, $1,444 for busi- 
ness audits, $1,240 for farm audits, and $924 for nonbusiness, nonfarm audits. 
The ODR does not classify taxpayers into different audit classes. Therefore 
in table 8.2, all subsequent tables, and our econometric analysis we have placed 
each  Oregon  return  in  the  same class  as the  matching  federal  return.  Our 
sample includes 1,667 independent Oregon audits, of which 802 are audits of 
filers whose federal returns were placed in an IRS business audit class, 77 are 
audits of  filers in an IRS farm class, and 788 are audits of  filers in an IRS 
nonbusiness, nonfarm class.” Approximately one-third of all Oregon audits in 
our sample resulted in no additional assessment, as compared to one-quarter 
of all federal audits. The largest Oregon no-change rates were in the business 
(39 percent) and farm (48 percent) categories. Approximately 5 percent of all 
Oregon audits in our sample resulted in a negative additional assessment; the 
mean negative assessment in the population was $578, while the median nega- 
tive assessment was $225. The frequency of negative state assessments and the 
average size of those assessments was somewhat smaller in the business and 
farm categories. The majority of all Oregon audits resulted in a positive addi- 
tional assessment, just as for federal audits. Over 61 percent  of all Oregon 
audits in our sample resulted in a positive assessment; the mean positive assess- 
ment in the population was $1,051, while the median assessment was $399. 
These figures  are  well  below  the  corresponding  figures  for federal  audits, 
which is not surprising because Oregon has essentially a fat  tax rate of 9 per- 
cent, well below the federal rate for most income categories. Approximately 
57 percent of all audits of  business returns, 49 percent of  all audits of  farm 
returns, and 66 percent of  all audits of  nonbusiness, nonfarm returns in our 
sample resulted in a positive  assessment; the mean positive assessments for 
these three groups in the population were $1,060, $1,317, and $1,032 respec- 
tively, while the median assessments were $442, $582, and $328. Our sample 
17. The ODR has informed us that our sample may include a small number of coding errors in 
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also includes 1,158 Oregon piggyback audits, including 280 audits of business 
returns, 23  audits of  farm returns,  and 855 audits of  nonbusiness, nonfarm 
returns.18  The mean assessment for all piggyback assessments in the population 
was $762, which is somewhat higher than the mean assessment for all indepen- 
dent Oregon audits, while the median piggyback assessment was $324, again 
higher than the corresponding figure for independent audits. The mean piggy- 
back assessment was $1,005  for business returns, $414 for farm returns, and 
$7 10 for nonbusiness, nonfarm returns, while the median  assessments were 
$374, $172, and $319, respectively. 
The focus of  our  analysis is on the  relationship  between  ODR and IRS 
audits. To  explore  this  relationship  we  have partitioned  the  returns  in our 
sample into five groups: (1) returns selected for both a federal audit and an 
independent state audit; (2) returns selected for both a federal audit and a state 
piggyback audit; (3) returns selected for a federal audit but not selected for a 
state audit; (4) returns selected for an independent state audit but not selected 
for a federal audit; and (5) returns not selected for audit by either tax authority. 
For each of these groups, table 8.3 presents the population frequencies as well 
as the relevant mean and median audit assessments. The top two rows of the 
table classify returns according to whether they were or were not selected for 
an IRS audit, and columns (1)-(3)  classify returns according to whether they 
were not selected for any kind of Oregon audit, were selected for an indepen- 
dent Oregon audit, or were selected for a piggyback audit. Note that the first 
row of column (3) is empty because it is logically impossible for a return to 
fall into the no federal audit, state piggyback audit category. For each category 
the table lists the population frequency and percentage frequency and, where 
appropriate, the mean and median assessments associated with each kind of 
audit performed. For convenience the table also displays the marginal totals 
for each row and column category. 
The figures in table 8.3 indicate that there were over one million resident 
filers in Oregon in 1987, of whom fewer than  1 percent were selected for any 
kind  of  audit. The IRS  selected  approximately  6,000  returns  for audit; the 
mean federal assessment was $2,146,  while the median assessment was $596.19 
The ODR selected slightly fewer than 2,000  returns for an independent state 
audit; the mean assessment for these audits was $626, while the median assess- 
ment  was  $79.  In  addition,  the  ODR  performed  slightly  fewer than  1,500 
piggyback audits; the mean assessment for piggyback audits was $762 and the 
median assessment was $324. 
The most interesting figures in table 8.3  are the individual cell totals. Con- 
sider first the cell including returns selected for both an IRS and an indepen- 
dent ODR audit. A population total of 328 returns fall into this cell. This is a 
18. Our data set also contains information about Oregon audits based on the IRS Information 
19. Note that the mean and median figures in table 8.3 are based on information about all audits, 
Returns Program, but we neither list these audits in table 8.2 nor use them in our analysis. 
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Table 8.3  IRS-Oregon Audit Interactions: All Returns 
Oregon 
No Audit  Independent Audit  Piggyback Audit  Totals 
IRS  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
No audit  1,004,408 (99.25)  1,624 (0.16) 
466 mean 
Audit  4,175 (0.41)  328 (0.03) 
32 median 
1,572 mean  5,746 fed. mean 
1,419 state mean 
294 median  1,924 fed. median 
644 state median 
626 state mean 
Total  1,008,503 (99.66)  1,952 (0.19) 
79 state median 
1,006,032 (99.41) 
1,488  (0.15)  5,991 (0.59) 
2,965 fed. mean  2,146 mean 
960 fed. median  596 median 
762 state mean 
324 state median 
1,488 (0.15)  1,012,023 (100) 
2,965 fed. mean 
960 fed. median 
762 state mean 
324 state median 
Notes: Figures weighted to reflect population totals. Figures in parentheses give number as a per- 
centage of all returns. 
far larger number than would be predicted to fall into the cell if the IRS and 
the ODR had selected returns for audit at random; apparently the criteria used 
by the different agencies to select 1987 tax returns for audit were similar. The 
audit assessments associated with returns in this cell were quite high, higher 
than the assessments associated with returns in any other cell. In particular, the 
federal mean  assessment for returns in this cell was $5,746, well  above the 
overall federal mean of  $2,146, while the federal median assessment for re- 
turns in this cell was $1,924, well above the overall median of $596. Similarly, 
the ODR mean (median) assessment for returns in this cell was $1,419 ($644), 
well above the mean (median) for all independent ODR audits of $626 ($79). 
We  believe  these findings make  sense and are quite  consistent  with  our 
model of state and federal tax audit decisions and assessments. For a return to 
fall into this cell, both the signal observed by  IRS and the signal observed by 
the ODR must have exceeded their threshold values. Although the signals may 
be positively correlated, they are not identical, and each is likely to contain 
information about both the federal and the state assessment distributions, as is 
true in our model whenever w,  and wf are positively correlated,  E, and E, are 
positively correlated, or the cross correlations p,,,  and pVqef  are large and posi- 
tive. As a result, the expected federal assessment is likely to have been larger 
when both signals exceeded their respective threshold values than when only 
the federal signal exceeded its threshold value, and the same is true for the 
state assessment. Although the mean  assessments associated with returns in 
this cell were substantially larger than the overall means, the differential be- 
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more dramatic, a finding that we interpret as follows. Whenever both authori- 
ties independently decide to conduct an audit, the probability that the assess- 
ment for that case will be negative or zero is substantially lower than if only 
one of the authorities prefers to audit. However, the probability of a very large 
“outlier”  assessment is only slightly increased when both agencies decide to 
audit.20 
Consider next the cell involving returns for which the ODR chose to conduct 
an independent audit, but the IRS chose not to conduct an audit. The mean and 
median  assessments associated with ODR audits of  returns in this cell were 
$466 and $32, respectively, well below the mean and median assessments asso- 
ciated with any other kind of ODR audits, including piggyback audits. These 
results are also consistent with our model. 
Now consider the remaining two cells that involve returns selected for an 
audit, the cell including returns selected for an IRS audit but not selected for 
an ODR audit and the cell including returns selected for an IRS audit and an 
ODR piggyback audit. There are 4,175 cases where the IRS performed an audit 
and the ODR performed no audit of any kind, and there are 1,488 cases where 
the IRS performed an audit and the ODR performed a piggyback audit. Thus, 
the ODR chose not to conduct a piggyback audit in the majority of cases for 
which the IRS performed an audit. The mean federal assessment for IRS audit 
cases that were not followed up with an ODR piggyback audit was $1,572, 
while the mean federal assessment for IRS audits that were followed up with 
a piggyback audit was $2,965. The median figures for these two cases are $294 
and $960, respectively. Although these figures indicate that the ODR did fol- 
low up on many of the most profitable federal audit cases, it nonetheless chose 
not to conduct a piggyback audit in many cases (several thousand) for which 
there was a sizeable federal assessment. We are not certain why the ODR chose 
not to conduct more piggybacks audits in  1987. However, we provide  some 
additional statistics and discuss this issue further later in the paper, in subsec- 
tion 8.3.3. 
Tables 8.4,8.5, and 8.6 duplicate the format of table 8.3 for each of the three 
20. The returns in this cell provide interesting information about the ability of tax examiners to 
detect noncompliance, because each return is subjected to two independent audits, resulting in 
two separate assessments. We explored the relationship between the federal and state assessments 
for the 283 returns (unweighted frequency) in this cell. Since Oregon’s  tax rate is (approximately) 
a flat 9 percent, we multiplied the Oregon assessment by  2.5, so that the average Oregon assess- 
ment was similar to the average federal assessment. We  considered first the 184 cases for which 
the federal assessment exceeded $1.000. For these cases, 14 Oregon assessments were nonpositive, 
25 (of the adjusted assessments, multiplied by  2.5)  were less than 0.25 as large as the federal 
asessment,  17 were between 0.25 and 0.50 as large,  107 were between 0.75 and  1.5 times as 
large, and 21 were more than 1.5 times as large. Next we considered the 35 cases for which the 
federal assessment was nonpositive. For these cases, 17 Oregon assessments were also nonposi- 
tive, 7 were between $0 and $400, and 6 were greater than $1,000. Since the federal tax rate varies 
with income, we examined how our results varied with variations in the reported federal tax bal- 
ance and adjusted gross income but found that the results were not sensitive to the levels of these 
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Table 8.4  IRS-Oregon Audit Interactions: IRS Business Class Returns 
Oregon 
No Audit  Independent Audit  Piggyback Audit  Totals 
IRS  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
No audit  61,829 (97.2)  629 (1.07) 
430 mean 
Audit  693 (1.09)  126 (0.20) 
1  median 
3,131 mean  5,830 fed. mean 
1,478 state mean 
337 median  2,431 fed. median 
857 state median 
594 state mean 
Total  62,522 (98.29)  805 (1.27) 
52 state median 
62,508 (98.27) 
284 (0.45)  1,103 (1.73) 
4.55 1 fed mean  3,805 mean 
1,527 fed. median  777 median 
1,005 state mean 
374 state median 
284 (0.45)  63,611 (100) 
435  1 fed. mean 
1,527 fed. median 
1,005 state mean 
374 state median 
Notes: Figures weighted to reflect population totals. Figures in parentheses give number as a per- 
centage of all returns. 
Table 8.5  IRS-Oregon  Audit Interactions: IRS Farm Class Returns 
Oregon 
No Audit  Independent Audit  Piggyback Audit  Totals 
IRS  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
No audit  7,094 (97.09)  63 (0.86)  7,157 (97.95) 
252 mean 
0 median 
Audit  113 (1.55)  14 (0.19)  23 (0.31)  150 (2.05) 
874 mean  13,987 fed. mean  1,757 fed. mean  2,233 mean 
0 median  2,007 fed. median  728 fed. median  1  median 
4,797 state mean  414 state mean 
172 state median  777 state median 
Total  7,207 (98.63)  77 (1.05)  23 (0.31)  7,307 ( 100) 
624 state mean 
0 state median 
1,757 fed. mean 
728 fed. median 
414 state mean 
172 state median 
Nores: Figures weighted to reflect population totals. Figures in parentheses give number as a per- 
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Table 8.6  IRS-Oregon Audit Interactions: IRS Nonbusiness, Nonfarm 
Class Returns 
Oregon 
No Audit  Independent Audit  Piggyback Audit  Totals 
IRS  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
No audit  935,485 (99.40)  882 (0.09) 
508 mean 
Audit  3,369 (0.36)  188 (0.02) 
76 median 
1,274 mean  5,077 fed. mean 
1,698 fed. median 
1,305 state mean 
448 state median 
648 state mean 
3 10 median 
Total  938,854 (99.76)  1,070 (0.11) 
99 state median 
936,367 (99.50) 
1,181 (0.13)  4,738 (0.50) 
2,607 fed. mean  1,757 mean 
849 fed. median  570 median 
710 state mean 
319 state median 
1,181 (0.13)  941,105 (100) 
2,607 fed. mean 
849 fed. median 
710 state mean 
319 state median 
Nores: Figures weighted to reflect population totals. Figures in parentheses give number as a per- 
centage of all returns. 
main categories of returns in our sample: business returns, farm returns, and 
nonbusiness, nonfarm returns. Most of the qualitative features of these tables 
are similar to the features of table 8.3, so we do not discuss them in detail. 
However, we note that  while  the  ODR performed  many  more independent 
audits than piggyback audits in both the business and the farm classes, it actu- 
ally conducted more piggyback audits than independent audits in the nonbusi- 
ness,  nonfarm  classes. Apparently  the  ODR allocates  most  of  its  audit re- 
sources  to  the  business  and  farm  classes.  We  also  note  that  the  mean 
assessments on independent state audits were fairly similar across audit cate- 
gories. In contrast, the mean assessment on federal audits was much larger 
for the business audit category than for either the farm or the nonbusiness, 
nonfarm category. 
8.3.2  Model Estimation Results 
In this subsection we present and discuss results from the estimation of our 
model of state and federal audit selection decisions and assessments. We pre- 
sent results for three different audit categories. The first category includes all 
returns in our sample that fall into the middle IRS business audit class; this 
IRS  class includes all business returns with reported schedule C total gross 
receipts between $25,000 and $ 100,000.21  The second category contains all 
21. There are two other IRS business audit classes. One consists of  all business returns for 
which the reported total gross receipts are below $25,000, and the other consists of all business 
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returns that fall into either of two IRS farm audit classes; we have pooled to- 
gether the returns for these two classes in order to obtain an adequate number 
of degrees of freedom for estimation. The final category includes all observa- 
tions for which the IRS placed the federal return in the middle IRS nonbusi- 
ness, nonfarm class; this IRS class includes all nonbusiness, nonfarm returns 
from  which  the  calculated total positive  income is  between  $25,000 and 
$50,000.22  For each category we first present and discuss results from the esti- 
mation of  the single-agency model, estimated separately for the IRS and for 
the ODR, then briefly discuss the estimation of the piggyback equation (lo), 
and then present and discuss results from the estimation of the remaining pa- 
rameters of the joint-agency model. All of our econometric results are based 
on a weighted analysis that accounts for the choice-based sampling scheme we 
employed in collecting our data. 
Table 8.7 presents results from estimation of the single-agency model for 
each audit class, while table 8.8 presents the results for parameters included in 
the joint-agency model but not in the single-agency models, with one excep- 
tion. The exception is that no results are presented in table 8.8 for  pufus,  the 
parameter that measures the degree of linear association between audit assess- 
ments when both agencies make a nonpositive audit assessment. Because our 
data include very few observations where both agencies make such an assess- 
ment, we were unable to reliably estimate this parameter. We  have therefore 
restricted the value of  this parameter to zero for all audit classes. Notice that 
table 8.7 does not list the explanatory variables included in xlf,  x2r,  x,,, and x,, 
for any of the classes and also does not present the estimates of the associated 
parameters P,', p,,,  PI,, and p2$.  Our contract with the ODR requires us not to 
disclose any information that might be used by others to infer the audit selec- 
tion criteria of either the IRS or the ODR. As a result, we cannot reveal either 
the explanatory variables or the parameter estimates associated with the ex- 
planatory variables included in the federal and state revenue assessment mod- 
els. We will discuss certain qualitative features of these variables below. Note 
also that both IRS and ODR audit assessments are measured in thousands of 
dollars in our analysis. The standard error estimates in tables 8.7 and 8.8 have 
been adjusted to account for choice-based sampling. However, we have not 
adjusted the standard error estimates in table 8.8 to account for the use of a 
multistage estimation procedure. Consequently, the estimated standard errors 
in this table may tend to overstate the precision of our parameter estimates to 
some extent. 
We  first discuss the results for the business class. There are 2,640 observa- 
tions in our data set in this class, of which 441 include federal returns that were 
selected for an IRS audit, 221 include state returns that were selected for an 
ODR independent audit, and 127 include state returns that were selected for 
22. There are  four other nonbusiness,  nonfarm IRS classes. The majority of  returns  in  our 
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Table 8.7  Estimation Results for the Single-Agency  Model 
Business Class  Farm Class  Nonbusiness. Nonfarm Class 
Correlation p,,, 
Correlation p,,,, 
Standard deviation uwt 
Standard deviation upt 
Shadow cost X,c, 
Number of observations 





Standard deviation uu, 
Standard deviation uss 
Standard deviation us 
Shadow cost h,c, 
Shadow cost X,c, 
Number of observations 
Number of  independent audits 





,1992  ,1571 
(0.18  1)  (0.2  16) 
.2695  .3910* 
(0.158)  (0.097) 
,984  1  *  1.334* 
(0.252)  (0.403) 
2.205*  2.210* 
(0.166)  (0.298) 
5.227*  2.518* 
(1.560)  ( 1.270) 
2,640  1,945 
44  1  148 
-318.4  -268.6 
Oregon Results 
.6654*  .8191* 
(0.229)  (0.087) 
.2 144  0.00" 
(0.125) 
.9772*  .9690* 
(0.007)  (0.012) 
,495  I *  .3868* 
(0.184)  (0.068) 
1.810*  2.015* 
(0.179)  (0.333) 
.4409*  .1391 
(0.065)  (0.078) 
.6842*  .9382* 
(0.176)  (0.458) 
.2705*  -.4124 
(0.039)  (0.687) 
2,640  1,945 
22  I  77 
127  23 
































Nore: Numbers in parentheses are adjusted standard errors. 
"Parameter is constrained to zero. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
an ODR piggyback audit. To determine what variables to include in xlf  and xZf 
we used a specification search to determine which tax return characteristics 
were significantly related to IRS audit decisions and assessments. We used a 
similar procedure to determine which variables to include in x,~  and xZs.  Ulti- 
mately,  only  a few x-variables  were  included  in  the  model,  indicating  that 
within this relatively narrowly defined audit class only a few return characteris- 
tics were relevant  for explaining audit  selection decisions and assessments. 264  James Alm, Brian Erard, and Jonathan S. Feinstein 
Further, the set of variables that were included in xlf  and x~~  only partially over- 
lapped with the set of variables included in x,, and xzs,  indicating that the IRS 
and the ODR relied on somewhat different variables in making their audit se- 
lection decisions for 1987 returns. 
Now consider in more detail the results presented in table 8.7 for the busi- 
ness class. Three features of the results are especially noteworthy. First, the 
four correlations pqfwf,  pVfsf,  pqsWs,  and p,,,  are all positive, indicating that, for 
each of the IRS and the ODR, the value of  the  signal observed by  the tax 
authority was positively  correlated with both the likelihood of  a positive as- 
sessment and, conditional on a positive assessment occurring, the magnitude 
of the assessment. The fact that the correlations are all relatively large suggests 
that both tax authorities possess extensive information about noncompliance 
behavior that we are unable to observe in our data. The largest of these correla- 
tions is p,  w,  the correlation between the state signal and the likelihood of a 
positive s&ie assessment, which equals .665; the other three correlations are 
all  approximately  equal to  .2, though  they  are somewhat  imprecisely  esti- 
mated. Second, the correlation between the piggyback signal qp  and the sto- 
chastic disturbance cp  in the piggyback equation is extremely large (.977). The 
fact that this correlation is so close to 1 indicates that the state knew almost 
exactly how much revenue it would earn from a piggyback  audit of  a  1987 
return, a fact which is not particularly surprising because the piggyback audit 
is based on the federal audit results and does not typically involve the examina- 
tion of tax records. Third, the estimates of the audit cost variables Xfc,, Xscs, 
and Xpc, are all precisely estimated and sensible. The estimate of  X,c,  is 5.23 
(recall that the revenue assessment variable is measured in thousands of dol- 
lars). From independent IRS data sources we have learned that the cost of a 
federal business audit of a  1987 return was approximately $1,000. Hence we 
estimate that the shadow value associated with increasing the IRS audit budget 
in this audit class by $1 is approximately $5, suggesting that if the IRS were 
allocated additional funds for business audits, net federal government revenue 
would  increase. Our estimate of 5 for the shadow value of  additional audit 
resources is far below previous estimates made by Dubin et al. (1990), which 
were based on the analysis of aggregate state-level data on federal audit assess- 
menk2?  Our estimate is also somewhat below an estimate of 8 made by Erard 
and Feinstein (1 994a) based on estimation of a slightly different audit selection 
model and using data from the same business audit class. The estimate of X,c, 
is 0.684. Although we do not at the present time posses reliable information 
about the cost of independent state audits, we believe that these audits are less 
expensive than federal audits and that c,  was probably in the neighborhood of 
$500 for audits of  1987 returns. Therefore we estimate that the shadow value 
23. It should be noted that the estimate by  Dubin et al. (1990) is intended to account for both 
the direct gain in audit revenue and any revenue resulting from increased deterrence. In contrast, 
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associated with increasing the ODR budget for independent business audits by 
$1  is approximately equal to $1, suggesting that state revenue could not be 
increased through greater enforcement within this class. Finally, the estimate 
of  X,c,  is 0.271. As for independent  state audits, we do not possess reliable 
information about the cost of state piggyback audits; however, we doubt that 
this cost exceeded $100 for 1987 returns. Hence we estimate that the shadow 
value  associated  with  increasing  the  ODR  budget  for piggyback  business 
audits is between  $2 and $3, which indicates that the ODR could have in- 
creased audit revenues within the business class by reallocating resources from 
independent audits to piggyback audits. This conclusion corroborates our ear- 
lier remark, made with respect to table 8.4, that the ODR appears to conduct 
many independent audits but relatively few piggyback audits of business filers. 
Now consider the results presented in table 8.8 for the business class. The 
estimates for all five of the correlations listed in table 8.8 are positive. The 
correlation p,,,,  appears to be quite precisely estimated at .449. The estimates 
of  the  two cross-correlations  p,,,,  and  pqVEf  are .189 and  .316, respectively, 
which are similar in magnitude to the estimates of the single-agency correla- 
tions p,,,,  and pVEEs  reported in table 8.7. The large positive estimate of  p,,?, 
indicates that much of the information that the IRS possesses about 1987 busi- 
ness filers that we are unable to observe is also possessed  by the ODR. The 
positive  estimate of  p,,,,  indicates that the information the IRS possesses  is 
positively correlated with the size of the state assessment. An interesting ques- 
tion is whether this information adds anything to the knowledge already pos- 
sessed by the ODR about the state assessment. To find out, we have used our 
results to compute an estimate of the partial correlation between the federal 
signal -qf and the state error term E,, conditional on the value of the state signal 
-q,.24 The estimated value of this partial correlation is .11, which indicates that 
the federal signal contains some information about the state assessment that is 
not contained in the state signal. Thus, it would appear that the ODR could 
improve its business audit selection procedures if it were made privy to more 
federal information. Similarly, the large positive estimate of pqSFf  indicates that 
the state may possess information that would be helpful to the IRS in predicting 
federal assessments. Indeed, our computations indicate that the implied partial 
correlation between the state signal q,  and the federal error term cf  conditional 
on the value of the federal signal qf  is equal to .23, which confirms that the 
state signal contains information about federal assessments not contained in 
the federal signal. These findings are consistent with the figures presented in 
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Table 8.8  Joint-Agency Model Results 
Nonbusiness, 
Business Class  Farm Class  Nonfarm Class 
.4486* 
(0.043) 
.I  890 
(0.155) 
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Note: Numbers in parentheses are partially adjusted standard errors. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
table 8.5, which indicate that in the business classes revenue assessments are 
much higher, for both the IRS and the ODR, when both authorities conduct an 
audit than when only one of the two conducts an audit. 
Two conclusions follow from these observations. First, the results in table 
8.8 for the joint-agency model are consistent with the results presented in table 
8.7 for the single-agency models. In particular, both sets of results indicate that 
both the IRS and the ODR possess extensive information  about compliance 
characteristics of  1987 business filers beyond what we are able to infer from 
individual tax reforms. Second, although much of this information is possessed 
in common by the two authorities, each authority also possesses some unique 
information  that  is correlated with the other agency's  revenue  assessments. 
This second conclusion leads us to believe that for business classes additional 
information  sharing between the two tax authorities  might significantly im- 
prove audit selection procedures. The estimates of the two remaining correla- 
tions for the business class listed in table 8.8, pwfws  and pFfEC,  are both very large 
and positive (.788 and S92, respectively). These results are sensible and are 
consistent both with the hypothesis that taxpayers who cheat on their federal 
return also cheat on their state return and with the complementary hypothesis 
that taxpayers who make a mistake on their federal return carry the mistake 
over to their state return. 
Having discussed the results for the business class in some detail, we now 
discuss the results for the farm and nonbusiness,  nonfarm classes. Our data 
set includes  1,945 observations pertaining  to the farm audit class and 9,239 
observations pertaining to the nonbusiness, nonfarm class. These data include 
information  on  148 federal  farm audits,  856 federal  nonbusiness,  nonfarm 
audits, 77 independent  state farm audits, and 200 independent state nonbusi- 267  The Relationship between State and Federal Tax Audits 
ness, nonfarm audits. The data also include information on 23 farm and 279 
nonbusiness, nonfarm state piggyback audit cases. As for the business class, 
we used specification searches to determine the variables to include in x,,,  x,,, 
xla,  and x2s  for our farm and nonbusiness, nonfarm classes. For the farm class 
our search resulted in the inclusion of a relatively small number of tax return 
characteristics as explanatory variables in both the federal and state assessment 
equations, just as for the business class. However, for the nonbusiness, non- 
farm class, our search resulted  in the inclusion of  a fairly large number  of 
explanatory variables in the federal assessment equations and a quite small 
number of explanatory variables for the state assessment equations. We do not 
think it is surprising that more tax return characteristics were needed to explain 
federal audit selection decisions and assessments in this class than in the busi- 
ness and farm classes, because this class includes a much wider variety of tax 
returns and patterns of noncompliance. We also do not find it surprising that 
few variables were important in explaining state audit selection decisions in 
this class, because the ODR appears to devote most of  its independent audit 
resources to business and farm returns. 
Consider now the results for the farm and nonbusiness, nonfarm classes re- 
ported in table 8.7. For the farm class the results indicate that the private signal 
of the IRS has a positive and significant correlation with the size of a positive 
audit assessment. In contrast, the private signal of  the ODR for this class is 
positively and significantly related to the probability of a positive assessment. 
The estimated correlation between the  state signal q,  and the error term w, 
(319) is very large and quite precise, indicating that the state possesses very 
good information about the likelihood of a positive farm audit assessment. We 
do not find it surprising that the state possesses better information than  the 
federal  government  about  the  likelihood  of  farm  noncompliance,  because 
farmers are spread across the state, and while the ODR maintains more than a 
dozen separate tax offices, the IRS operates out of a single district office lo- 
cated in Portland. This is one filer group for which local information seems 
especially important. Interestingly, while the ODR seems to possess superior 
information about the likelihood of a positive audit assessment, the IRS seems 
to possess better information about the probable magnitude of such an assess- 
ment. Indeed, the estimated correlation between the ODR signal q, and the 
error term E, converged to zero in estimation, indicating that the ODR has no 
private information beyond what can be obtained from tax return data about 
the likely magnitude of  a positive assessment. For the nonbusiness, nonfarm 
class the results indicate a positive correlation between each agency’s private 
signal and the likelihood  of a positive  assessment. However, the  values for 
and pqsc,  converged to zero in estimation for this audit class, indicating 
that neither agency possesses private information about the likely magnitude 
of a positive audit assessment for a nonbusiness, nonfarm return. The estimated 
value of p,  is very close to 1 for each of these classes, again indicating that 
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the state has extremely accurate information about the potential revenue asso- 
ciated with a piggyback audit. The estimated values of the audit cost parame- 
ters X,cf  and  X,c,  are approximately 2.5 and 0.95, respectively, both  for the 
farm class and the nonbusiness, nonfarm class. Farm audits tend to be about 
as costly as business audits for the IRS, suggesting that the shadow value asso- 
ciated with increasing IRS farm audit resources by $1 is approximately $2.50, 
only about one-half as much as the corresponding figure for the IRS business 
class. Federal nonbusiness, nonfarm audits tend to be the least costly type of 
federal audit. Based on an estimate of $600 as the average cost of  such an 
audit, the implied shadow value of increasing IRS nonbusiness, nonfarm audit 
resources by $1 is approximately $4, somewhat below the estimated shadow 
value for business audits but well above the estimated shadow value for farm 
audits. Apparently the IRS could have obtained greater revenue by performing 
more audits of business returns for tax year  1987 and fewer audits of  farm 
returns. We assume that state farm audits cost about the same as state business 
audits (roughly $500) and that state nonbusiness, nonfarm audits are somewhat 
less expensive (perhaps $300). Based on these assumptions, we estimate that 
the shadow value of an additional $1 of state audit resources is about $2 for a 
farm audit and $3 for a nonbusiness, nonfarm audit. Our estimates imply that 
the state could have obtained greater revenue by allocating more resources to 
nonbusiness, nonfarm audits and less to business audits. Our estimate of X,c, 
is negative but very imprecise for the farm class. For the nonbusiness, nonfarm 
class the estimate is 0.28, quite similar to the value obtained for the business 
class. Based on an assumed piggyback audit cost of about $100, we estimate 
that the shadow value of an additional dollar of piggyback audit resources for 
the nonbusiness, nonfarm class is between $2 and $3. 
Now consider the results for the farm and nonbusiness, nonfarm classes pre- 
sented in table 8.8. For both classes, the estimated correlation between the state 
and federal signals is high, indicating a substantial degree of overlap between 
the information  sets of  the two agencies. For the  farm class, the estimated 
cross-correlations pnfSs  and p,,,  are quite large, indicating that each agency has 
information that pertains to the other agency’s audit assessment distribution. 
To determine whether the information the IRS possesses would be useful to 
the ODR in formulating its audit strategy, we have again computed the implied 
partial correlation between  the federal  signal qf and the state error term  E, 
conditional on the value of the state signal qs.  The value of this partial correla- 
tion for the farm class is S4, indicating that the federal signal contains a great 
deal of information about state audit assessments not contained in the  state 
signal. We have also computed the implied  partial  correlation  between  the 
state signal q, and the federal error term  E~ conditional on the value of the 
federal signal qf  for the farm class. The value of this correlation is .60, which 
indicates that the state signal contains a great deal of information about federal 
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information sharing between the two agencies might result in substantial im- 
provements to state and federal farm audit selection procedures. On the other 
hand, the estimated cross-correlations for the nonbusiness, nonfarm class are 
small in absolute value and statistically insignificant. Apparently, there is less 
scope for improved audit selection through information-sharing arrangements 
for this class. Just as for the business class, the estimates of the two remaining 
correlations listed in table 8.8, pwtw,  and pEfEs,  are positive and generally quite 
large for the farm and nonbusiness, nonfarm audit classes, indicating a strong 
link between compliance behavior on federal and state tax returns. 
8.3.3  Additional Findings 
We have recently  conducted a detailed analysis of  the ODR individual in- 
come tax audit programs. Our analysis has generated two findings that we be- 
lieve may be of  some general interest and applicable to other states. First, as 
was previously indicated during our discussion of table 8.3, our data indicate 
that the ODR did not follow up on a significant number of cases for which the 
IRS conducted an audit and made a significant positive assessment. Table 8.9 
provides some additional information about this finding. According to the sta- 
tistics presented in  the table,  of the  198 federal  audit cases in our data for 
which the IRS assessed more than $10,000, Oregon did not follow up on 106, 
or more than half. Of the 249 federal audit cases in our data for which the IRS 
assessed between $5,000  and $10,000, Oregon did not follow up on 142, again 
more than half. Of the  1,428 federal audit cases for which the IRS assessed 
between  $1,000 and $5,000, Oregon did not follow up on 845. Surprisingly, 
Oregon did follow up on many cases for which the IRS made far lower assess- 
ments, as is also indicated in the table. Of course it is possible that our data are 
wrong, and that Oregon did follow up on many of the audits in question. We 
are still discussing this possibility  with  Oregon officials but, at the  present 
time, have discovered no evidence in support of this hypothesis. We believe 
that the more likely explanation for the above finding is that the ODR either 
did not receive information about many of these audits or did not retain the 
information for later use. We wonder whether the results presented in table 8.9 
are similar for other states. 
Our second findings is that for tax year 1987 ODR audits of part-year and 
nonresident filers generated larger mean and median assessments than were 
generated by  audits of  any other filer groups. Table 8.10 presents additional 
information related to this point. The figures in the table indicate that the ODR 
conducted very few audits of part-year and nonresident filers for tax year 1987 
but made large revenue assessments. If this second finding is correct and car- 
ries over to more recent years, it suggests that the ODR might be able to in- 
crease its revenue assessments by shifting some of its audit resources to these 
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Table 8.9  Taxpayers in Sample with a Positive Federal Audit Assessment by 
Whether They Were Subjected to a State Audit of Any Kind 
Number of Cases 
Federal Audit Assessment 








183  61 
405  320 
596  275 
845  583 
142  107 
106  92 
2,277  1,438 
~~  ~ 
Note: Figures weighted to refiect population totals. 
Table 8.10  State Audit Results by 'Qpe of Form 
Form 40F  Form 40s  Form 40P  Form 40N 
Number of audits  1,913  100  36  75 
Mean audit assessment  733  340  1,175  1,87  1 
Median audit assessment  88  77  215  744 
Note: Figures weighted to reflect population totals. 
8.4  Conclusion 
Little is known  about state audit programs and about the relationship be- 
tween these state programs and federal tax enforcement activities. In this paper 
we use data provided by the Oregon Department of Revenue and the Internal 
Revenue Service to examine various aspects of these programs. In particular, 
we find that there is substantial-though  not complete-overlap  between the 
information employed by the ODR and the IRS for audit selection and that the 
information used by one agency is not always made known to the other. This 
result suggests that the enforcement  activities of  each agency could be im- 
proved through greater information sharing. We also find that the ODR may 
have foregone substantial amounts of  audit revenue by  not following up on 
more returns for which IRS had made large audit assessments. Finally, we find 
that each agency could increase its collections by reallocating its enforcement 
budget among the various audit classes, although the efficient reallocation is 
not the same for the ODR and the IRS. 
It should be remembered that these results are based on an analysis of the 
interactions between federal and state enforcement efforts in a single state (Or- 
egon). The results might differ if other states were examined. Indeed, our sur- 
vey  of  state audit programs clearly indicates that the individual income tax 
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most other states. The shadow value of  additional audit resources, the scope 
for resource reallocation, and the benefits from additional federal-state infor- 
mation sharing may  actually be much higher for some of  these other states 
than we have found for Oregon. 
Appendix 
In this appendix we analyze in somewhat greater detail the strategic version of 
our federal and state model, which was mentioned previously in subsection 
8.2.2. Recall that in this version of the model the state tax authority makes a 
decision whether to perform an audit in the first period, taking into account 
the possibility that it may have the opportunity to piggyback on a federal audit 
in the second period if it should choose not to audit in the first period. Figure 
8A.1 illustrates the decision tree associated with the auditing choice faced by 
the state tax authority in the first period of the model. 
The top branch of the tree corresponds to the decision to conduct a period- 
one audit; the expected value associated with this branch is E(RJq,) -  h,c,, 
which is identical to the expected value associated with a period-one audit in 
the nonstrategic model. The bottom branch of the tree corresponds to the deci- 
sion to wait. In the nonstrategic model, the value associated with this branch 
is zero, and the state chooses to conduct a period-one audit whenever E(RJqJ 
2  X,c,.  However, in the strategic model this branch has a more complex struc- 
ture, and the value associated with waiting is typically positive. 
To demonstrate that the value associated with this branch is generally posi- 
tive, we describe the logical structure of this branch in detail. The wait branch 
leads first to a random event involving the federal authority’s period-one audit 
decision. If the federal authority chooses not to audit, the value associated with 
the wait branch of the tree is zero. However, if the federal authority chooses to 
audit, the federal assessment R, is revealed, and the state authority faces a fur- 
ther decision in period two, whether to conduct a piggyback audit. The federal 
authority’s audit selection decision is the same as in the nonstrategic model, 
and therefore there is a threshold value -$  such that the federal authority 
chooses to conduct a period-one audit if and only if qr  2  qf*.  Since the signal 
ER, -  h,  C, 
IRS Audit; Learn R,  , qp 
Wait 
No IRS  Audit 
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q,  is observed by  the state authority and is correlated with the signal q,, the 
state authority assesses the probability of  a federal audit as Prob(q, 2  qTlq,), 
which can be written as a function L(q,).  Suppose now that the federal author- 
ity has conducted a period-one audit and has made a revenue assessment R,. 
At the beginning of period two the state observes the signal q, and computes 
the net expected value of performing a piggyback audit to be E(R,IR,,  q,) - 
Q,. Since the net value associated with no piggyback audit is zero, the state 
will choose to perform a piggyback audit whenever E(RplR,, q,)  > X,c,,  or 
whenever q, exceeds the threshold value qlp*. The threshold value qt  is itself a 
function of R,, denoted qlp*(R,).  What expected value should the state authority 
then assign to the option of performing a piggyback audit in period two, as of 
period one? Since the option is relevant only when the federal authority con- 
ducts a period-one audit, the state authority must evaluate the distribution of 
R,,  conditional on the signal q, and on the event qf > -I$,  and then use this 
conditional distribution to compute the expected value of  the piggyback op- 
tion. Applying the logic of this argument, the expected value of the piggyback 
option may be denoted Q(q,) and be expressed as 
The expected value associated with the wait branch of the decision tree is then 
L(qs)Q(qs),  which in general is positive. 
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COIlltnent  James W. Wetzler 
One of  the mildly exasperating rituals of my tenure as New York State Com- 
missioner of Taxation and Finance involved the State Division of the Budget’s 
annual request for suggestions on how the Tax Department could increase tax 
collections in the upcoming fiscal year by  expanding its audit program. The 
department’s Audit Division would respond with proposals to start new audit 
programs and would attach revenue estimates implying that these audits would 
be far more productive than the audits that would have been conducted under 
a proportional expansion of the existing audit effort. Indeed, sometimes the 
numbers would indicate that the new audits would be more productive than the 
average productivity of the existing effort. 
I would ask why, if these new audits were expected to be so productive, the 
Audit Division had not seen its way through to undertake them by rearranging 
priorities  within  its  existing budget. A  generally  unsatisfactory  discussion 
would ensue, in which the division would point out various reasons why these 
highly productive new audits could only be done with additional resources. 
Finally, overcoming my skepticism, I would agree to forward the proposals to 
the Budget Division; after all, there are worse bureaucratic outcomes than an 
increase in one’s budget. The Budget Division would then tell the governor 
(correctly) that they had really put pressure on the stodgy bureaucrats over 
at the Tax  Department and, by  doing so, had produced more money for him 
to spend. 
Similar Kabuki dances occur at other tax administration agencies. Some- 
times, the difference between the concepts of average and marginal productiv- 
ity, and their link to audit selection processes, are simply not well understood; 
sometimes, they are just ignored or fuzzed up for bureaucratic reasons. Hence, 
you can imagine my enthusiasm at being asked to discuss a paper that attempts 
a rigorous characterization of the audit selection process. 
There is some conventional wisdom that deserves to be subjected to analy- 
sis: the overwhelming consensus among present and former tax administrators 
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is that dramatic increases in audit coverage would be beneficial. As tax com- 
missioner, I was frequently asked why I could not address New York  State’s 
chronic budget problem by  “doing something” about tax evasion. Conversely, 
in some quarters, support is growing for “getting the IRS off our backs,” a 
sentiment that is likely to be translated into budget reductions and, ultimately, 
a further reduction in audit coverage. 
It is not clear to what extent either support for, or opposition to, expanded 
audit coverage is based on a proper differentiation between average and mar- 
ginal productivity. Just how productive is the marginal audit? Answering this 
question requires modeling the audit selection process, the task attempted in 
this paper by Alm, Erard, and Feinstein (hereafter AEF). Moreover, by focusing 
on the interaction between federal  and state audit decisions, the paper  ad- 
dresses an aspect of  the problem that is likely to become increasingly im- 
portant as federal-state cooperation in tax administration expands. 
Let me start by describing the individual income tax enforcement program 
in New York State, which forms the basis of my  experience. In recent years, 
New York’s strategy has been to assume that the federal government does its 
job properly and achieves accurate measurements of federal taxable income. 
The state’s job, therefore, is to fill in the gaps and monitor features of  the state 
income tax that the federal government ignores-residency,  failure to file state 
returns, and the adjustments that lead to differences between state and federal 
taxable income such as the exclusion of interest on Treasury securities and the 
inclusion of  interest on out-of-state municipal bonds. New York  State uses 
information from the IRS to reconcile mismatches between items reported to 
the IRS and to the state, along with a variety of data sources to identify nonfil- 
ers. The principal field audit effort consists of  audits of  taxpayers who file 
as nonresidents but are suspected of  being residents, a very productive but 
controversial audit program. New York does not generally attempt independent 
estimates of federal taxable income. 
When a New York  taxpayer is audited by  the IRS, he or she is required 
to file information about the federal changes with the New  York  State Tax 
Department. Periodically, the department receives tapes from the IRS on fed- 
eral audit adjustments and conducts desk audits of those taxpayers who had 
not voluntarily reported the federal changes. With modern computer technol- 
ogy, these audits are extremely inexpensive and very productive. 
This appears to be approximately the program that AEF recommend for Ore- 
gon on the basis of their analysis. That is reassuring. 
This paper models the audit selection process for the IRS Oregon district 
and the Oregon state government. Each tax administrator is assumed first to 
attempt to identify taxpayers who have underreported their tax liability on the 
basis of  information on the tax returns along with “signals” based on other 
information, intuition, astrology, or whatever. Then, for the taxpayers expected 
to have some positive underreporting, each tax administrator estimates the ex- 
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signals that may overlap but are not necessarily identical to those used in step 
one. Presumably, at the federal level the information on the tax returns used 
for audit selection corresponds to the scoring of each return under the DIF (or 
discriminant function) program, while the signals reflect the fact that the IRS 
district offices do not mechanically select for audit only those returns with the 
highest DIF scores. Finally, the state tax administrator is assumed to decide 
whether to conduct a piggyback audit to make state adjustments corresponding 
to federal audit changes for those taxpayers who were subjects of  a federal 
audit and owed additional federal tax. 
This appears to be an accurate characterization of the process and, by sepa- 
rating the positive from the zero or negative audit changes, makes the analysis 
more mathematically tractable. 
What is, or should be, the objective of the tax administrator in making audit 
selection decisions? AEF are a little fuzzy on this point because they lack data 
on how much audits cost and, therefore, are forced implicitly to assume that 
the tax administrator faces a constant cost per audit. 
One possible objective would be to maximize tax assessed per audit, an ap- 
proach that would focus audit activity on those taxpayers believed to have the 
worst compliance. A second possibility would be to maximize aggregate tax 
assessed for the audit effort as a whole, which would require selecting for audit 
those taxpayers for whom assessments per dollar of audit cost were expected 
to be highest. (The authors note, but leave to future research, the problems of 
reductions in assessments after the audit is completed on account of  appeals 
or litigation and the possibility of failure to collect the amount of  tax owed, 
problems that are quite important in practice.) If all audits involved the same 
cost, the two objectives would lead to the same audit selection rule, which is 
what is modeled in AEF’s paper; but if costs vary, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the two objectives. (Properly measured, the costs should include costs 
of appeals and litigation of  audit assessments and costs of collecting the tax 
debts arising from the audits.) 
An objective of maximizing aggregate audit assessments would require fore- 
going some expensive audits of  taxpayers with larger amounts of  underre- 
porting in favor of cheaper audits of taxpayers with smaller but easier-to-detect 
underreporting  . Were taxpayer behavior independent of the audit process, this 
would maximize the productivity of the audit program; however, it would run 
the risk of encouraging taxpayers to engage in hard-to-detect forms of noncom- 
pliance. (Presumably, the most egregious cases of  tax evasion could still be 
addressed outside the  audit process through  criminal prosecutions for tax 
fraud.) It would also be perceived as unfair: taxpayers expect enforcement to 
concentrate on the worst offenders, not just the ones whose offenses are easiest 
to detect. 
My  understanding is that the IRS generally tries to select for audit those 
returns with the highest expected noncompliance. The New  York  State Tax 
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probably  reflects  the  state’s greater focus on short-run budgetary objectives 
arising from its need to achieve annual cash flow budget balance.  The state 
also does a better job than does the IRS of distinguishing between assessments 
on the one hand and actual collections arising from audits on the other. It might 
be helpful to secure the State of Oregon’s characterization of what it thinks it 
is trying to maximize in its audit selection process. 
This issue of  exactly what should be optimized in an audit program can 
be analyzed at ever greater levels of sophistication. A sensitive issue involves 
situations where enforcement activity can be expected to indicate that taxpay- 
ers have  overpaid. Correcting  these mistakes  is presumably  of  some social 
value, but how does one account for this benefit? In the AEF model, tax admin- 
istrators never audit a taxpayer expected  to have a negative  assessment, but 
they are aware of the fact that, statistically, some of their audits will produce 
negative  assessments. (In the data, negative  assessments for any given year 
often represent the flip-side of an audit that produced a positive assessment for 
another year by changing the timing of income or deductions, and these nega- 
tive assessments really should be netted  against that other year’s positive as- 
sessment.) Accounting for penalties is also tricky; presumably, tax administra- 
tor should not audit merely to obtain revenues from penalties, whose purpose 
is not to raise revenue but rather to encourage voluntary compliance. 
It may also be the case that some types of noncompliance should be consid- 
ered less worthy of correction than others. Random errors, that can be expected 
to even out over a taxpayer’s life, might be less serious than systematic errors. 
Underpayments by  lower income taxpayers may be less serious than under- 
payments  by  the  rich,  although  the  concern  over  noncompliance  with  the 
earned income credit suggests that public concern with low-income noncom- 
pliance grows when the tax system is used to deliver income maintenance ben- 
efits. 
The paper does not make completely clear what it is that state auditors do. 
Do Oregon’s auditors attempt to verify federal taxable income, the adjustments 
to federal taxable income needed to compute Oregon taxable income and other 
items idiosyncratic to the state tax return, or both? To the extent that Oregon’s 
audits address items that are needed only to compute state tax, then the AEF 
strategic model of state auditing neglects a potentially important choice. Under 
the strategic model, state auditors wait to see if a return is subject to federal 
audit, observe the result, and then decide whether to conduct a piggyback audit 
based on federal audit changes, However, an additional choice exists as long 
as the statute of limitations has not expired-conduct  a state audit to verify the 
state tax items. Indeed, a large federal audit adjustment may well be a strong 
signal that state tax adjustments are inaccurately reported as well. 
The AEF model produces an estimate of the expected productivity of the 
marginal  audit. When  divided  by  audit cost  (assumed  to be  constant), this 
equals the shadow price of  audit resources (A). Given the administrators’ ap- 
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expansion of the audit effort. AEF’s estimated As  are surprisingly low, which 
is an important result. It may well be that the conventional wisdom is wrong 
and that a quantum expansion of audit coverage is not called for. However, the 
low As may just reflect the particular middle income and small business audit 
classes that AEF chose to analyze. 
The low estimates of  A  may  also be an artifact of the assumption that all 
audits have the same cost. If  the marginal audit costs less than inframarginal 
audits, a likely scenario, the assessment per dollar of cost of the marginal audit 
will be higher than estimated by AEE 
AEF’s policy recommendations are based on the judgment that A should be 
equalized across audit programs. This would be true if the tax administrator’s 
objective were to maximize assessment per dollar of audit cost, but not if the 
objective were to maximize assessment per audit, except in the special case 
where all audits cost the same. 
A very interesting feature of the AEF model is that it permits the estimation 
of the state revenue gain from additional piggyback audits that would result 
from an expansion of federal audit coverage. Arguably, the IRS should take this 
gain into account in its resource allocation decisions. In any case, a measure of 
the state benefit would give the IRS an argument to use when going to the 
Office of Management and Budget and Congress to defend its budget. 
It is worth noting that the IRS has recently changed its approach to tax en- 
forcement. Reconciling itself to the fact that low audit coverage is likely to be 
the case for the foreseeable future, the IRS is restructuring its enforcement 
program to emphasize targeting enforcement efforts so as to maximize volun- 
tary compliance. This involves identifying market segments of taxpayers, mea- 
suring their level of noncompliance, identifying the causes of that noncompli- 
ance, and taking systematic actions to address those causes. The new approach, 
termed Compliance 2000, will require a significant investment in research and 
analysis and much greater use of information provided by states, which possess 
much of the data needed to analyze individual market segments. I am enthusi- 
astic that the new approach can achieve significant improvements in the level 
of nationwide tax compliance. 
The Internal Revenue Service and the State of Oregon are to be commended 
for funding AEF’s research. The rigorous analysis of audit selection, such as is 
provided here, will enable tax administrators and their critics to be much more 
rational in their management of the audit function. 